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Don’t Think Twice, It’s Alright 
Hilary Kornblith 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
We arrive at most of our beliefs unreflectively. As we navigate the 
world, beliefs about our surroundings are, inevitably, simply pro-
duced in us. Similarly, the vast majority of our actions are unre-
flective. We don’t have to think about every little thing we do; we 
simply act. But we also, at times, stop to reflect: Is this what I 
should believe? Is this what I should do? 
What does such reflective activity achieve? Some philosophers 
have suggested that reflecting about what we should believe is 
necessary if our beliefs are to be justified. In the case of action, 
some philosophers have suggested that reflecting about what one 
should do is necessary for freedom of the will and moral respons-
ibility. One might think that there are more humble benefits as well. 
Beliefs which are the product of reflective activity are more likely 
to be true than beliefs unreflectively arrived at; actions reflectively 
produced are more likely to be successful in achieving their goals 
than unreflective actions. This is just, it seems, good common 
sense. 
This paper challenges both common sense views about the 
benefits of reflection as well as a good deal of recent philosophical 
thinking. It would be silly to think that reflection is never valuable, 
but I will argue that both common sense, and much philosophical 
thought about the nature and importance of reflection, have vastly 
overestimated its value. I will begin with an account of what I take 
to be the common sense view about the value of reflecting on our 
beliefs and actions, as well as traditional philosophical thought on 
this topic. My own views on this issue have become increasingly 
radical over recent years. I want to present an argument, step by 
step, both to explain, and to justify, my ever increasing radical-
ization on this topic. As I now see it, the common sense view not 
only grossly misrepresents the value of reflective belief and action; 
it presupposes a view about the nature of our thought which is 
almost certainly false. If I am right, the very nature of human 
thinking is nothing like the way we represent it to ourselves when 
we deliberate about what to believe and what to do. 
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1. Common Sense about Reflection 
Let me begin with some common sense thoughts about human and 
animal minds and the differences between them.  
Human beings are not the only animals with mental states. A 
great many other animals must be credited with beliefs and desires, 
as well as a variety of other mental states, if we are to explain the 
sophistication of their problem-solving behavior. But while dogs 
and cats, cows and kangaroos, parrots and chimpanzees, all clearly 
have beliefs and desires, there is one very important respect in 
which their beliefs and desires differ from ours: their beliefs and 
desires are directed exclusively at the world around them—they 
have beliefs about food and shelter, other creatures, and the various 
threats and opportunities which their environment presents them 
with—while our own mental states are not only directed at the 
world around us; they are also turned in upon themselves. We not 
only have beliefs about the world around us; we have beliefs about 
our mental states. We are thus capable of thinking about our be-
liefs and desires, and, inevitably, when we do this, we sometimes 
come to wonder: Should I really believe this? Should I really act on 
this desire? Other animals, who lack the capacity to reflect on their 
own mental states, do not and cannot entertain such questions.1 
We not only differ from other animals in this respect. We differ 
from very young children in this respect as well. While physical 
object concepts are early arrivals in human conceptual develop-
ment, mental state concepts arrive much later. Young children have 
beliefs and desires directed at the world around them well before 
they are capable of entertaining thoughts about their own mental 
life or the mental lives of those around them.2 
                                                 
1 I have argued that this view of the difference between human adults, on the 
one hand, and other animals and young children, on the other, is roughly correct 
in Knowledge and its Place in Nature, Oxford University Press, 2002, Chapter 2. For 
some standard works in cognitive ethology which support this view, see John 
Alcock, Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach, 10th edition, Sinauer 
Associates, 2013; Colin Allen and Marc Beckoff, Species of Mind: The Philosophy 
and Biology of Cognitive Ethology, MIT Press, 1997; Daniel Povinelli, Folk Physics for 
Apes: The Chimpanzee’s Theory of How the World Works, Oxford University Press, 
2000; Jacques Vauclair, Animal Cognition: A Introduction to Modern Comparative 
Psychology, Harvard University Press, 1996.  
2 See, for example, Janet Wilde Astington, The Child’s Discovery of the Mind, 
Harvard University Press, 1993; Janet W. Astington, Paul L. Harris, and David 
R. Olson, eds., Developing Theories of Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1988; 
Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff, Words, Thoughts, and Theories, MIT Press, 
1997; and Henry Wellman, The Child’s Theory of Mind, MIT Press, 1992. 
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Young children and non-human animals thus take on a rich 
network of beliefs about the world around them without being cap-
able of reflecting on the questions of whether they should believe 
as they do, whether they should want the things they want, or 
whether they should act on the basis of particular desires they 
happen to have. Beliefs and desires are produced within them by 
mental mechanisms of which they are entirely ignorant. In the case 
of their beliefs, some of these mental mechanisms are extremely 
reliable: they tend to produce accurate beliefs about the world, 
beliefs which are far more often true than false. But some of these 
mental mechanisms are not reliable at all: they tend to produce far 
more false beliefs than true ones.  These creatures, however, do not 
have the conceptual capacity to think about these matters. Their 
belief-producing mechanisms hum along, doing what they do, 
producing a variety of beliefs, both true and false. It is much the 
same with desires. A variety of mental mechanisms produce desires 
in children and other animals, and these desires interact with their 
beliefs to produce behavior. Some of these behaviors are extremely 
effective in allowing these creatures to get what they want, all things 
considered. Others are not nearly so effective.  But these 
mechanisms, like the mechanisms which produce beliefs, simply 
hum along, doing what they do, producing desires and behaviors 
of all sorts. 
Adult human beings are more complicated creatures. Our cap-
acity to reflect on our beliefs and desires affords us a degree of 
sophistication that other creatures lack. It allows us to contemplate 
epistemological questions—questions, for example, about whether 
we should believe as we do—and various moral questions as well—
questions about whether we should act on the basis of certain 
desires we may have, and even questions about whether we should 
want some of the things we want. More than this, it seems that we 
can do far more than simply raise these questions. Our ability to 
think about whether we should believe as we are inclined to do, 
and desire as we are inclined to do, and act as we are inclined to 
act, allows us to play a role in determining what we believe, and 
what we desire, and what we do that more conceptually limited 
creatures cannot. 
Let us consider a few examples. Suppose I come to realize that 
I have certain beliefs about the upcoming presidential election. I 
believe that one particular candidate, widely discussed as a serious 
contender, is likely to be pushed out of the race fairly quickly. I be-
lieve that another candidate, who is not much discussed, is a far 
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more serious contender. I believe that one of the two major parties 
has little chance of winning the election, and that the other party is 
overwhelmingly likely to win. 
Now very young children and other animals, of course, do not 
have beliefs about elections. But what I want to focus on here is 
not the fact that I have certain beliefs about the coming presidential 
election. Rather, I want to focus on the fact that I am aware that I 
have those beliefs: I not only believe certain things about the com-
ing election; I also know that I have those very beliefs. Young 
children and other animals, as we’ve noted, do not have the con-
ceptual capacity to form beliefs about their own beliefs. So even in 
the case of very simple beliefs—say, beliefs about objects in front 
of them—young children and other animals do not have the con-
ceptual capacity to recognize that they have those beliefs. And my 
noting that I have certain beliefs is not idle; it can prompt me to 
think about whether I ought to have those beliefs. On coming to 
realize that I’ve already come to believe certain things about the 
forthcoming election, I can’t help but wonder whether I am really 
justified in believing as I do. Are my beliefs really supported by the 
evidence I have, or are they a product, perhaps, of wishful thinking? 
When I think about these questions, I am led to think about the 
evidence I have for my beliefs. I do my best to evaluate that evi-
dence to keep myself honest. If the evidence really does support 
my beliefs, I should continue to hold them. If it doesn’t—if, for 
example, I come to suspect that I have been engaging in wishful 
thinking—then I should revise my beliefs accordingly. Beliefs are 
produced within me in my unreflective moments. Stopping to 
reflect on these beliefs and the evidence I have for them serves as 
a check on the processes of belief-acquisition which operate within 
me prior to reflection. If I don’t ever stop to reflect on these beliefs, 
I am, in effect, just crossing my fingers and hoping for the best: 
hoping, that is, that the processes of belief-acquisition which 
operate within me when I am unreflective are ones which tend to 
produce true beliefs. If I do stop to reflect on my beliefs, however, 
I can do better than this. I can take charge of my intellectual life 
rather than be a mere bystander. I can make sure that my beliefs 
are reliably formed rather than simply trust to luck. I can be a 
responsible epistemic agent rather than someone who idly 
sleepwalks through his intellectual life. 
We not only take charge of our intellectual lives when we stop 
to reflect on beliefs already formed in us. We may also stop to 
deliberate about what to believe on some subject prior to having 
4
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any beliefs on the matter at all. A student asks me for some advice 
on a complicated issue, one I had not given any prior thought to at 
all. I stop to think about the matter, and consider various courses 
of action. Which of the various courses of action open to her do I 
believe to be the best? I think about the advantages and disad-
vantages of various choices she might make, and I come to an 
opinion on the matter. Here my deliberation concerns what to 
believe, rather than whether a belief I already have is one I am 
entitled to. But just as in the case of deliberating about the cred-
entials of an already existing belief, my deliberation about what to 
believe allows me to take charge of my intellectual life. I am not 
merely passive in allowing beliefs to be formed within me by what-
ever psychological mechanisms happen to be housed within my 
mind. I take responsibility for my beliefs by way of my deliberation. 
I am an epistemic agent, rather than a leaf blowing in the wind. 
The same is true of my desires. I like coffee. I like coffee a lot. 
At a certain point, I notice that I’m drinking an awful lot of it. I 
have coffee before I leave the house. I make a small pot of coffee 
when I arrive at the office, and I finish it off before lunch. I have 
coffee with lunch, and then, when I get back to the office, I make 
another small pot of coffee, which I finish off before I return 
home. My coffee consumption slowly but surely increased over 
time without my fully realizing it. But now that I do realize it, it 
occurs to me that this cannot be healthy. I like coffee. I want to 
drink it. My coffee drinking behavior was brought about by my 
desire for coffee. But in reflecting on just how unhealthy my coffee 
consumption has become, and how my desire for coffee has slowly 
but surely brought this on, I come to think that I would be better 
off if I didn’t like coffee so much. Although I like coffee, I come 
to wish that I didn’t like it quite so much. Although I desire coffee, 
I desire that I should stop desiring coffee. Although I act on the 
basis of my desire for coffee, I desire that my desire for coffee 
should not be effective in producing action. 
These are the kinds of thoughts that young children and other 
animals simply cannot have. They do not have the conceptual 
capacity to think about their desires, and so they cannot have these 
thoughts. Their behavior is brought about, in a fairly direct way, by 
their beliefs and desires. But I can stop to reflect on my desires, 
and think about whether these are desires I want to have, and 
whether I want the desires I have to be effective in producing 
action. Instead of behaving in ways that are determined by various 
mental mechanisms operating in me without my knowledge, I can 
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take charge of my life by reflecting on my desires and the kind of 
life I want to live. I can play an active role in determining which of 
my desires I act upon, rather than passively sitting back and letting 
my behavior simply happen. I can take responsibility for my life. I 
can be a morally responsible agent.  
So what does the capacity to reflect upon our mental states do 
for us? As common sense would have it, this capacity does not 
merely make us more complicated than young children and other 
animals. Instead, the capacity to reflect upon our beliefs and desires 
is transformative. Young children and other animals have a great 
storehouse of beliefs about the world around them, and many of 
these beliefs are true. More than this, it is no coincidence that so 
many of their beliefs are true. These beliefs are produced by reliable 
cognitive processes operating within them. But these are not the 
only kinds of cognitive processes which operate in young children 
and other animals. Their mental mechanisms include extremely un-
reliable processes of belief acquisition as well. And this, in turn, 
means that they also have a great many beliefs which are false, and 
not coincidentally so. The processes of belief acquisition which 
operate within these creatures, processes which are shaped by nat-
ural selection, are not all geared to producing truths. All of these 
processes, both the ones which are extremely reliable and the ones 
which are extremely unreliable, operate within these creatures with-
out their being aware of them. These creatures have a mental life, 
to be sure; but in one very straightforward sense, their mental life 
is not their own. It goes on in them, but they do not direct it. They 
are merely passive vessels for a complicated set of mental 
mechanisms and the mental states which they produce. 
The capacity to reflect on one’s mental life is transformative, 
not because it makes us more complicated, but because it allows us 
to be in charge of our mental lives. By reflecting on our beliefs and 
desires, we may take responsibility for what we believe, and what 
we desire, and what we do. We can play an active role in our mental 
lives, instead of being simply passive. The capacity to reflect allows 
us to be epistemically and morally responsible agents, and not 
merely the theater in which our mental life plays out as we stand 
idly by. 
This is, as I see it, the common sense view of the difference be-
tween young children and other animals, on the one hand, and 
adult human beings, on the other. This is common sense made 
more explicit than it usually is, but it is, nonetheless, I believe, the 
common sense view of the importance of reflection. 
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2. Some Recent Philosophical Thinking about Reflection 
and Justified Belief 
A great deal of recent philosophical thinking about reflection mere-
ly expands upon these common sense thoughts. 
Consider, for example, Laurence BonJour’s views about the 
nature of justified belief. BonJour sees a deep connection between 
our capacity to reflect on our beliefs and the very possibility of 
having beliefs which are justified. He has offered a very widely 
discussed counterexample to views of justified belief which divorce 
our capacity for justified belief from the capacity to reflect. Thus, 
consider reliability views of justification. On such views, a belief is 
justified just in case it is reliably produced.3  One need not know 
that one’s belief is reliably produced, or believe that it is reliably 
produced, or even have evidence that it is reliably produced in 
order for the belief to count as justified, according to such views. 
But BonJour argues that any such view will have deeply counter-
intuitive consequences. Thus, consider Norman, who is in fact 
clairvoyant, but has no evidence whatsoever that he has this power. 
One morning, he wakes up and finds himself believing that the 
President is in New York. Although he has no evidence whatsoever 
that this is true, his belief is, in fact, caused by his reliable clair-
voyant power. Reliability accounts of justified belief would need to 
say, it seems, that Norman’s belief is justified. But as BonJour 
argues, this is extremely implausible. As BonJour remarks, 
...Norman’s acceptance of the belief about the 
President’s whereabouts is epistemically irrational 
and irresponsible, and thereby unjustified... Part of 
one’s epistemic duty is to reflect critically upon 
one’s beliefs, and such critical reflection precludes 
believing things to which one has, to one’s know-
ledge, no reliable means of epistemic access.4 
So, as BonJour sees it, when Norman takes on the belief about the 
President’s whereabouts uncritically—that is, without reflecting on 
the question of whether he has adequate evidence for the belief—
he is failing in his epistemic duty; he is behaving in a way which is 
                                                 
3 The locus classicus here is Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?,” in 
George Pappas, ed., Justification and Knowledge, Reidel, 1979, 1-23. 
4 The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press, 1985, 42. 
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epistemically irresponsible; and, for that very reason, his belief 
about the President is unjustified. This claim, I believe, has strong 
intuitive appeal, and it fits well with the common sense views of 
reflection just canvassed. 
Notice that BonJour’s objection to counting Norman’s belief 
as justified does not depend on the fact that, in the imagined 
example, Norman has no evidence that the President is in New 
York. Rather, the problem, as BonJour sees it, is that Norman 
failed to reflect on the epistemic credentials of his belief. Even if 
Norman had adequate evidence that the President is in New York, 
his failure to reflect on whether he had good reason for his belief 
shows him to be epistemically irresponsible in holding it, and, for 
that very reason, his belief is not justified. We might summarize 
BonJour’s view in the form of a slogan: The unreflected-upon 
belief is not worth having. But intuitive as BonJour’s reflective 
requirement on justified belief may be, it cannot be right. 
Thus, imagine a case in which I have wonderfully detailed 
evidence that the President is in New York. I know that he 
announced a trip to New York more than a week ago; I know that 
the newspapers reported this morning that he will be arriving in 
New York shortly; I myself am in New York and I see the 
Presidential motorcade proceeding down Fifth Avenue. I come to 
believe, as a result of all of this, that the President is now in New 
York, and, in attempting to honor BonJour’s requirement that, as 
a responsible epistemic inquirer, I reflect on the credentials of my 
belief, I do exactly that: I ask myself whether I have good reason 
for my belief about the President’s location, and I self-consciously 
scrutinize all of my evidence, and I note that my evidence provides 
powerful reason to believe that the President is in New York. So it 
seems that I have satisfied BonJour’s reflective requirement for 
justified belief. 
But I haven’t satisfied BonJour’s requirement. I have reflected 
on my reasons for believing that the President is in New York, and, 
as a product of that reflection, I came to believe that I had adequate 
evidence for this belief; I based my belief about the President’s 
whereabouts on the results of my reflective examination of my 
evidential situation. But now consider my belief that my evidence 
supports my belief that the President is in New York. I haven’t 
reflected on that belief. It was formed as a product of reflection, 
but it has not yet been reflected upon. And BonJour says that I 
have an epistemic duty to reflect on my beliefs, and, if I hold some 
belief that I have not reflected upon, I am being epistemically ire-
8
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sponsible, and, so, that belief is not justified. Since I haven’t yet 
reflected on my belief that I have sufficient evidence to believe that 
the President is in New York, that belief, according to BonJour, 
must count as unjustified.  And since my belief about the Presi-
dent’s whereabouts is based on my belief about my evidential 
situation, which is, according to BonJour, unjustified, it follows that 
my belief about the President’s whereabouts is also unjustified. 
The problem, I think, is quite straightforward. According to 
BonJour, if I have not reflected upon my reasons for holding some 
particular belief, then I am being irresponsible in holding that be-
lief, and so that belief counts as unjustified. So I stop to reflect. But 
now the beliefs formed as a product of reflection have not them-
selves been reflected upon, and so they are unjustified. If I stop to 
reflect on them, then the same problem arises all over again. Reflec-
tion must stop somewhere, and wherever it does, the beliefs which 
result from it are themselves unjustified. But since the point of 
reflection was to justify my original belief, and that belief is now 
based on an unjustified belief, it too is unjustified. BonJour’s reflec-
tive requirement is thus unsatisfiable. It sets a standard for justified 
belief which cannot possibly be met. The suggestion that a belief 
cannot count as justified unless it is reflected upon thus cannot be 
right. 
One might think that there is still some reason to connect 
justified belief with reflection, even if the reflective requirement 
cannot be put in the very simple and straightforward way that 
BonJour presents it. Surely, one might say, there are advantages to 
be gained by reflecting on one’s beliefs, even if one cannot reflect 
“all the way down,” as BonJour’s requirement would have us do. 
Ernest Sosa offers a very plausible suggestion. Unlike BonJour, 
Sosa does not require that a belief be reflected upon in order to 
count as justified. He does, however, suggest that reflective know-
ledge is better than knowledge without reflection, that is, it is better 
than what he calls “animal knowledge.” 
One has reflective knowledge if one’s judgment or be-
lief manifests not only...[a] direct response to the 
fact known but also understanding of its place in a 
9
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wider whole that includes one’s belief and know-
ledge of it and how these came about.5 
If one stops to reflect on one’s belief—say, that the President is in 
New York—one may come to be aware of a variety of facts about 
its evidential standing and its causal origin, things one would not 
have been aware of without stopping to reflect. And on Sosa’s 
view, while these things are not necessary for justified belief or for 
knowledge, they serve to improve one’s epistemic position. 
Since a direct response supplemented by such 
understanding would in general have a better 
chance of being right, reflective knowledge is better 
justified than corresponding animal knowledge.6 
So the thought here is that reflection can make one better justi-
fied than one would have otherwise been by making one aware of 
one’s evidential situation, and, in virtue of that fact, beliefs reflected 
upon are more likely to be true than beliefs which are not reflected 
upon; they “have a better chance of being right.”7 
The claim that reflecting on the epistemic credentials of one’s 
beliefs improves one’s chances of having true beliefs is utterly 
commonsensical. It is, of course, an empirical claim about the pow-
er of reflective self-examination, and so it is worth examining the 
empirical evidence here to see what is known about the effects of 
such reflection. As it turns out, however, the empirical evidence 
does not support Sosa’s view. Let me briefly review some of the 
relevant evidence.8 
When we stop to reflect on our reasons for belief, we are not 
capable of bringing to mind all of the evidence we have. The 
capacity of short-term memory is quite small, and this limits the 
                                                 
5 “Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue,” reprinted in his Knowledge in Perspective: 
Selected Essays in Epistemology, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 240. 
6 Ibid.  
7 In more recent work, Sosa has not made this claim. See, for example, his 
Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, vol. II, Oxford University 
Press, 2009; Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press, 2011; and Judgment and 
Agency, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
8 I have provided a more thorough review of the evidence in Knowledge and its 
Place in Nature, chapter 4, and in On Reflection, Oxford University Press, 2012, 
chapter 1. 
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number of items we can bring to mind at any one time. On the 
whole, it is often easier to remember recent experiences than ones 
from our distant past, and a variety of factors which are entirely 
unconnected to the strength of one’s evidence plays an important 
role in determining how easy it is to bring these bits of evidence to 
consciousness. As a result, the evidence we bring to mind when we 
reflect is unlikely to give us a terribly accurate picture of the 
evidence we actually have which bears on our beliefs. This may 
make it sound as if it is largely a matter of random factors at play 
when we reflect whether we will come to overestimate the strength 
of our evidence, or underestimate the strength of our evidence, or, 
by mere chance, get it roughly right. But, as it turns out, things are 
even worse than this. There is a very well documented confirm-
ation bias at work when we reflect. Beliefs which support the belief 
reflectively examined are more easily brought to mind than 
disconfirming evidence. Thus, when we stop to reflect on the 
evidential credentials of one of our beliefs, we are likely to find that 
the evidence we self-consciously survey gives us good reason to go 
on believing as we already do. Reflectively surveying our evidence 
does not serve to alert us to our mistakes; it does not make our 
resulting beliefs more accurate, on the whole, than they would 
otherwise be. What it does, however, is tend to increase the 
confidence we have in the beliefs we antecedently held.9 
The depth of the problem here is best illustrated by the phen-
omenon of confabulation. Let us consider a particularly striking 
demonstration of this phenomenon, the case of choice blindness. 
Subjects are asked a series of questions about their preferences or 
their beliefs. They may be asked, for example, whether they prefer 
strawberry or grape jam; they may be asked whether they favor 
raising taxes or lowering them; they may be asked about their 
opinions on a variety of moral and political issues. Having an-
swered these questions, the subjects are then asked why it is that 
they chose as they did. Subjects are divided into two groups. The 
first group is asked, for each choice which they in fact made, why 
they made that choice. But in the second group, subjects who 
chose, for example, strawberry over grape jam are asked, “Why did 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Peter Wason and Philip Johnson-Laird, Psychology of Reasoning: 
Structure and Content, Harvard University Pres, 1972; Richard Nisbett and Lee 
Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment, Prentice-Hall, 
1980, chapter 8; Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, The Enigma of Reason, Harvard 
University Press, 2017 
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you choose grape jam rather than strawberry?”. In each case in the 
second group, subjects are asked, that is, why it is that they made a 
choice which, in fact, they didn’t make. 
Amazingly, only a very small percentage of subjects notice that 
they are asked to explain a choice they did not make. More than 
this, those who do not notice the switch go on, quite fluently, to 
offer a justification for their supposed choice. These justifications 
do not differ in detail, or in cogency, from the justifications offered 
by the first group of subjects, those who are justifying choices they 
did, indeed, make. Subjects are not only unaware that experi-
menters have misled them about the choices they made. The 
justifications they offer for their supposed choices are offered with 
sincerity and conviction. They take themselves to be explaining the 
basis for a choice they made only moments before.10 
It is tempting to explain away these results by supposing that 
the subjects were not paying attention; that they did not care about 
the choices presented to them; or that they were trying to please 
the experimenter rather than sincerely answer the questions posed 
to them. But all of these explanations of the phenomenon have 
been carefully controlled for and rejected. Subjects genuinely take 
themselves to be explaining why they chose as they did, even 
though the choices they offer explanations for are ones they did 
not actually make. The phenomenon turns out to be quite robust, 
and it builds on the important work of Richard Nisbett and 
Timothy Wilson done years earlier.11  
Nisbett and Wilson argued that, appearances to the contrary 
notwithstanding, we do not have direct introspective access to our 
mental processes. Although we seem to be able to tell, just by 
introspection, how we arrived at a belief or choice, the appearances 
                                                 
10Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Sverker Sikstrom, Betty Tarning, and Andreas 
Lind, “How Something Can Be Said about Telling More than We Can Know,” 
Consciousness and Cognition, 15(2006), 673-692; Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, and 
Sverker Sikstrom, “From Change Blindness to Choice Blindness,” Psychologia, 
51(2008), 142-155; Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, and Nick Chater, “Preference 
Change through Choice,” in R. Dolan and T. Sharot, eds., Neuroscience of Preference 
and Choice, Elsevier, 2011, 121-141. For a review of this literature and a discussion 
of its philosophical implications, see Hayley Webster, Self-Knowledge, Choice 
Blindness, and Confabulation, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst, 2019. 
11 “Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,” 
Psychological Review, 84(1977), 231-259. 
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here are illusory.12 In fact, our judgments about our mental pro-
cesses are the product of elaborate subconscious inference in 
which we attempt to reconstruct what the process must have been 
by which we reached the belief, or the decision, which we did. Such 
processes of rational reconstruction are not all inaccurate. Indeed, 
they are often quite accurate. They are, however, very far from the 
mark when, for example, our original decision or belief was less 
than fully rational, or, as in the choice blindness cases, where we 
are asked to explain a belief or decision that we did not actually 
make. In effect, it seems that the manner in which we reconstruct 
our mental processes involves the implicit assumption that those 
processes were rationally based. As a result, our judgments about 
the origins of our beliefs are particularly misleading on precisely 
those occasions when we would like to be able to call upon reflec-
tion to locate our errors.13 The more we need correction, the more 
misleading our reflective judgments will be about the processes by 
which our beliefs and decisions were reached. 
Sosa’s very commonsensical suggestion that reflectively screen-
ed beliefs are more likely to be true than beliefs which are not 
reflectively examined turns out not to be correct. There is, I believe, 
an interesting feature of a great deal of philosophical thought about 
reflective self-examination from the time of Descartes to the pres-
ent day. Epistemologists have often worried about the status of our 
beliefs. Do we really have reason to believe the things we do? A 
variety of skeptical arguments are presented which cast doubt on 
the status of our beliefs and this is then seen as providing a 
motivation for epistemological theorizing about the nature of 
justification and knowledge, as well as for a more careful reflective 
examination of our beliefs. The results of this reflective examina-
tion are then presented as a source of reassurance about the legiti-
macy of the beliefs which reflection certifies. When this kind of 
project is presented by someone with the philosophical skill and 
the literary talents of Descartes, it is very, very hard to resist, and 
the history of epistemology since the time of Descartes bears 
witness to the power of his vision. But Descartes combines an 
                                                 
12 See also Alison Gopnik, “How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-
Person Knowledge of Intentionality,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16(1993), 1-15 
and 90-101. 
13 See my “Introspection and Misdirection,” reprinted in my Second Thoughts and 
the Epistemological Enterprise, Cambridge University Press, 2019. 
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undue skepticism about the legitimacy of unreflectively arrived at 
belief with an overly optimistic view of the powers of reflective 
self-examination to set things right. The beliefs we arrive at unre-
flecttively are not nearly as problematic as Descartes feared, and 
reflective self-examination is not nearly as useful in correcting our 
errors as Descartes supposed. If we are to understand the nature 
of justified belief and knowledge, the nature of epistemic respons-
ibility and rationality, we will need to have a clearer idea of just how 
reflection works, and how unreflective belief works as well, than is 
to be found in much of the philosophical tradition following 
Descartes. 
3. Some Recent Philosophical Thinking about Reflection 
and Action 
Let us look at one exceptionally influential piece of work on the 
connection between reflection and action: Harry Frankfurt’s 
“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.”14 Frankfurt 
begins by noting the differences between adult human beings, on 
the one hand, and children and non-human animals, on the other, 
that we have already noted: While the beliefs of children and non-
human animals are exclusively about the world around them, adults 
are also capable of having beliefs about their own beliefs. Similarly, 
adults, unlike children and non-human animals, are capable of 
having desires which are directed at their own desires. And this 
means that adults have a far more complicated psychology than do 
children and non-human animals. 
As Frankfurt sees it, children and non-human animals are 
capable of free action: they may act in ways which are driven by 
their desires so that they are likely, in the ordinary course of events, 
to get what they want.15 They are not, however, capable of what 
Frankfurt refers to as freedom of the will. 
The human adult capacity to reflect on our beliefs and desires 
allows us a degree of flexibility in our behavior of which other 
                                                 
14 Reprinted in his The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, 11-25. 
15 Actually, it is slightly more complicated than this. They are likely to get what 
they want, on the assumption that their beliefs are true. That is, if their beliefs 
were true, the actions driven by their desires would serve to get them what they 
want. But this complication will not be important for the issues discussed in the 
text. 
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animals are incapable. If a child or a dog desires food, then, other 
things being equal, this will produce behavior which is designed to 
satisfy that desire. But if you or I want food, we may stop to reflect 
on whether we really want to act on that desire. I may have a strong 
desire for chocolate cake, but when I reflect on that desire, I would 
prefer not to act on it.  Indeed, perhaps because I wish to stick to 
my diet, and having the craving for chocolate cake is so frustrating, 
I actually wish that I did not even have the desire for cake. As 
Frankfurt sees it, this possibility of surveying our desires and 
thinking about whether we actually wish to be moved by them, or 
whether we wish to have them at all, makes us different sorts of 
creatures altogether from young children and non-human animals. 
It is this possibility of either endorsing our desires and, in virtue of 
that endorsement, acting on them, or, alternatively, rejecting our 
desires, and, in virtue of that rejection, failing to act on them, that 
makes us capable of freedom of the will, something which children 
and non-human animals are, according to Frankfurt, incapable of. 
As Frankfurt describes it, a creature incapable of reflecting on its 
beliefs and desires is “a helpless bystander to the forces that move 
[it].”16 The capacity to reflect on one’s desires and deliberate about 
whether one wishes to be moved by them, however, transforms us 
from passive bystanders who merely witness our own behavior into 
genuine agents—persons, to use Frankfurt’s terminology—
responsible for our own behavior. 
Such a view accords nicely with the common sense account of 
the differences between adult human beings and children and non-
human animals surveyed at the beginning of this paper. But there 
is a problem which this view faces. Frankfurt recognizes that my 
desire for chocolate cake may, in an important sense, not be fully 
my own. I may encounter it as an alien force operating within me, 
one I wish to resist. As Frankfurt sees it, the desire becomes fully 
my own when it is endorsed by a higher-order desire. Without that 
higher-order endorsement, the desire for chocolate cake is merely 
a force operating within me, something I may be witness to, but 
not something fully my own. 
So suppose that I reflect on my desire for chocolate cake, and, 
unlike the self-controlled dieter, I have no need at all, and no desire, 
to diet. I not only desire chocolate cake, I like having this desire, 
and I fully enjoy acting on it. I thus form the desire to act on my 
                                                 
16 Op. cit., 21. 
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desire for the piece of cake. I endorse my desire for the cake and, 
it seems, make it fully my own. By having this higher-order desire 
to act on my desire for the cake, my action of eating the cake 
manifests my freedom of the will. 
Or does it? For consider now my higher-order desire: my desire 
to act on my desire for the cake. This desire was arrived at as a 
product of reflection. I reflected on my desire for the cake, and 
considered whether I really wished to be moved by it. But although 
I have reflected on my desire for the cake, I have not reflected on 
my desire to be moved by my desire for the cake. And, on 
Frankfurt’s view, that makes my higher-order desire a mere force 
that is operating within me, rather than a desire which is truly my 
own. If this higher-order desire plays the crucial role in determining 
my behavior which Frankfurt has assigned it, I am then merely 
moved by a force within me, rather than moved by a desire which 
is wholly my own. To make it my own, I would have to reflect on 
this higher-order desire. But, of course, this would not solve the 
problem. It would just reproduce it at the higher-level. 
This is, of course, the exact same problem which arose for 
BonJour’s view of justified belief. If beliefs which are not reflected 
upon are not justified, we cannot justify them by reflecting on our 
evidence for them, since the resulting beliefs about our evidence 
will themselves be unjustified, since they have not yet been 
reflected upon. Reflecting on them, however, will not solve the 
problem. It will simply reproduce the problem one level up. 
It should be no surprise that Frankfurt’s view runs into this 
problem. The idea that children and non-human animals are 
“merely pushed around by their desires,” if that is a problem, 
cannot be solved by introducing still more desires, even higher-
order desires such as the desire to be moved by particular desires.17 
If the worry is that our mental states somehow push us around, 
being pushed around by more of them, and more complicated 
ones, is hardly reassuring. So either we should see the role which 
beliefs and desires play in determining action as presenting no 
impediment to freedom of any sort, or we should see the added 
complexity which higher-order desires afford us as making us no 
more free than other creatures who lack them. But either way, we 
                                                 
17This problem for Frankfurt was pointed out by Gary Watson in “Free 
Agency,” Journal of Philosophy, 72(1975), 218.  
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should not see some fundamental difference in kind between crea-
tures who have this kind of complexity and those who lack it. 
Just as Frankfurt’s view about freedom of the will faces the very 
same problem as BonJour’s view about justified belief, it also faces 
problems as a result of our current understanding of the 
psychological processes involved in reflection. Frankfurt addresses 
the problem of freedom of the will by examining the character of 
human action from the perspective of the actor him or herself. 
Frankfurt describes the deliberative process from the perspective 
of the deliberator, and he takes that perspective at face value. Thus, 
when the deliberator engages in some sort of interior monologue, 
thinking through the pros and cons of various courses of action, 
Frankfurt simply assumes that this monologue accurately reflects 
the decision process of the agent. But as Nomy Arpaly nicely points 
out, one’s interior monologue need not accurately reflect the 
psychological forces at work in the deliberator. Someone thinking 
through the question of whether to eat a piece of chocolate cake 
may think, “I really enjoy chocolate, and that cake looks great. But 
I need to stick to my diet so I can lose the weight I’ve been putting 
on. I don’t want to act on the basis of my desire for the cake. I’ll 
just skip it.” As Frankfurt presents it, this is the monologue of the 
self-possessed dieter, someone who acts on the basis of a higher-
order desire not to be moved by the desire for cake. This is a 
paradigm case of freedom of the will, rather than letting oneself be 
pushed around by desires one just happens to have. Such a mono-
logue may indeed be the product of a self-possessed agent, but it 
may equally be the monologue of someone suffering from ano-
rexia, compulsively starving himself to death, all the while present-
ing his choice in his interior monologue as a model of rationality.18 
One cannot take the perspective of the deliberating agent, whether 
about what to believe, or what to do, as an accurate record of the 
psychological processes which produce belief and action. The 
literature which we so briefly reviewed earlier, involving confirm-
ation bias, confabulation, and choice blindness only serves to 
deepen this point. 
 
                                                 
18Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency, Oxford 
University Press, 1996, 18.  
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4. Summing Up Thus Far 
We have seen that the human capacity to reflect on our beliefs and 
desires is regarded by quite a number of philosophers, whether they 
are examining epistemological questions about our beliefs or 
questions about the nature of free action, as deeply revealing of 
important differences between adult human beings and children 
and other animals. Adult human beings are, to be sure, more 
complicated creatures, psychologically speaking. But these philo-
sophers see the capacity to reflect on our mental states as making 
us importantly different in kind from children and other animals. 
In both the examination of epistemological issues and the examin-
ation of free action, this account of such important differences is 
aided and abetted by a methodology which takes the perspective of 
the deliberator at face value; it assumes that the deliberative process 
proceeds in just the way it seems to proceed when one engages in 
deliberation. But as I have argued, this methodology is funda-
mentally mistaken. An accurate account of the deliberative process 
shows that we are subject to an illusion when we deliberate. We 
seem to be directly aware of the psychological processes by which 
our beliefs and our actions are produced, and it is this illusion 
which has shaped a good deal of the philosophical discussion in 
epistemology and action theory. What is needed in these areas is a 
philosophical account which is informed by our best current under-
standing of the psychology of deliberation. As I have argued, there 
is every reason to believe that such an account will look very dif-
ferent from some of the most influential philosophical views 
currently on offer. 
Just a few years ago, this is where I was content to leave the 
matter.19 As I saw it then, our perspective on our beliefs and 
choices, when we stop to reflect on them, is often quite inaccurate. 
It leaves out a great deal, so that we are typically unaware of many 
of the factors which influence our beliefs and our choices. And 
even as far as it goes, much of the picture it presents to us of our 
own decision process is mistaken, as the literature on confabulation 
shows. The process of deliberation, both about what to believe and 
about what to do, is far less efficacious in influencing our beliefs 
and choices than it seems to be when we reflect. When it is effica-
cious, it will often make us more confident in our beliefs and our 
                                                 
19 In On Reflection. 
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choices, but no more accurate or effective in our decisions. It can, 
to be sure, at times, improve our beliefs and our decisions, but it 
can also make our beliefs and choices less accurate and less effect-
tive.20 
I stand by all of these conclusions. But I now think that this 
understates the extent to which reflection on our beliefs and deci-
sions distorts our view of our own mental processes. In all likely-
hood, I now believe, our mental processes are nothing like the way 
they appear to us when we deliberate. Let me explain the basis for 
my newfound radicalism. 
5. What Belief Change and Decision Making are Really 
Like 
For ease of exposition, let me focus on belief change, although my 
conclusions here apply just as much to decision making. 
When we deliberate about what to believe, we seem to be able 
to survey our beliefs, or at least many of them, and assess the 
strength of our reasons for and against a claim that we wish to 
question. To return to my earlier example: If I find that I am tempt-
ed to believe something about the coming presidential election, I 
may stop to reflect on my evidence in order to figure out whether 
I should believe as I am tempted to. I try to figure out whether I 
have genuinely good reasons for this belief, or whether I might be 
engaging in wishful thinking. In trying to figure all of this out, I 
present myself with a variety of arguments designed to reveal the 
strength of my evidence. If I can construct a strong argument for 
some claim about the result of the coming election, from premises 
I reasonably believe, and I can find no convincing counter-
argument that is similarly based, then I should follow where the 
evidence leads and endorse the conclusion of the argument I have 
constructed. This is what we seem to do when we deliberate. 
Now the points we have already made about the psychology of 
reasoning show this picture to be badly oversimplified. There are 
premises we rely on without our being aware of them. And some 
of the premises we think we rely on are ones which play no role in 
our reasoning. But the picture I have presented thus far did not 
                                                 
20 Jamin Halberstadt and Timothy Wilson, “Reflections on Conscious 
Reflection: Mechanisms of Impairment,” in Jonathan Adler and Lance Rips, 
eds., Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, 548-565. 
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challenge the idea that the way to think about human reasoning is 
on the model of argumentation. When we reason, whether self-
consciously or automatically, it is quite natural to assume that what 
goes on in us just is a matter of internal argumentation. When all is 
proceeding as it should, our beliefs are determined by good argu-
ments from premises we properly accept. 
This picture of human reasoning is very widely taken for grant-
ed in the literature on epistemology.21 Nevertheless, there is little 
attempt in this literature to show that this assumption squares with 
what we know from experimental work in psychology. This is 
unfortunate, because this is an area in which psychological work 
has a very direct bearing on how we should view epistemological 
issues. 
One philosopher who has examined these issues in detail is 
Jerry Fodor. Fodor has defended the view that human thought is 
encoded in mentally represented sentences, although these sent-
ences are part of a distinctive mental language—a language of 
thought—rather than in any natural language, such as English, 
Chinese, or Swahili.22 Our beliefs are just stored sentences in the 
language of thought, related to one another by various logical 
relations, and our mind is structured in such a way as to be sensitive 
to the logical relations among these sentences. One may think of 
the mind, on this view, as a computational device: our beliefs are 
written into the device’s memory, and the device is equipped with 
a program which, when new information is acquired, draws out the 
consequences of combining that information with the data already 
stored in memory. On this view, human inference is just argument-
ation in the language of thought. 
The vast majority of Fodor’s attention has been on what he 
calls “input modules.” For example, on this view, there is a 
dedicated bit of mental software devoted to visual information pro-
cessing. Just as one’s word processing program can do one job and 
                                                 
21 I challenged this picture in “Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence 
Theory,” reprinted in my A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, 17-31, but I now think that it is possible to fill in the 
details to this challenge in ways I did not see then. A different line of attack on 
this approach is presented by Anna-Sara Malmgren in “Availability, Goodness, 
and Argument Structure,” forthcoming. 
22 The Language of Thought, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1975; The Modularity of 
Mind, MIT Press, 1983; LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
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do it well, the visual information processing system takes visual 
input and transforms it into information which can then be made 
available to the rest of the mind, but it does nothing else. The visual 
processor is able to do what it does both quickly and reliably 
because it doesn’t draw on all of the information we have stored in 
memory. It makes use of a small dedicated body of information 
which allows it to perform its job, and the fact that this body of 
information is insulated from the rest of what we know vastly 
simplifies the information-processing task it needs to perform: it 
doesn’t need to sift through the large store of information in our 
memory, and thus it doesn’t need to figure out which parts of that 
large store of information are relevant to its information-
processing task. Each of our input systems works in this way, 
thereby making what would otherwise be an immensely compli-
cated task into something tractable. 
Of course, these input systems must eventually make their 
results available to what Fodor calls “central processing.” And this 
is where the problems with Fodor’s picture begin to emerge. 
Indeed, Fodor himself is well aware of these problems. As Fodor 
argues, we now know a great deal about various input systems. The 
fact that their information-processing tasks are narrowly defined, 
and that they each operate on the basis of a small body of inform-
ation insulated from the rest of what goes on in cognition, is exactly 
what makes these systems easily amenable to study. But if we want 
to know about central systems, where belief acquisition and revi-
sion take place, no such restrictions apply. As Fodor makes clear, 
central systems must draw on all of the information we have stored 
in memory. The processes of belief acquisition and revision, as 
Fodor argues, is global, unlike the local information-processing 
that goes on in the various input modules. 
And this leads Fodor to endorse what he self-mockingly calls 
Fodor’s First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science: “the 
more global...a cognitive process is, the less anybody understands 
it.”23 As Fodor sees it, we don’t understand anything at all about 
central systems, and thus, nothing at all about how belief 
acquisition and revision take place because we don’t understand 
how the kinds of computational processes which Fodor builds in 
to the mind could possibly operate on the vast body of information 
which we have stored in memory. 
                                                 
23 The Modularity of Mind, 107. 
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Sweeping as this conclusion is, I think it understates the implic-
ations of Fodor’s approach. Fodor’s picture of the mind as a 
computational device which stores information in sentences in a 
language of thought and which processes information based on the 
logical relations among those sentences does not just leave us with 
no understanding of how belief acquisition and revision work. 
Rather, this picture makes belief acquisition and revision impos-
sible. 
Let me explain. Fodor rightly sees that input systems, as he 
defines them, are able to do their job precisely because they have 
access only to a small body of information. Central systems, which 
have no such limitation, must work with all of the information 
which we have stored in memory, all of which, as Fodor sees it, is 
relevant to every single instance of belief acquisition and revision. 
When computer scientists try to define the difficulty of a comput-
ational task, they are interested in just how much computing time 
the task will take. And it is always the case that sifting through more 
information will take more time. But some tasks are such that the 
length of time they take grows in a linear fashion with the amount 
of additional data they need to work through: if they need to engage 
with twice as much data, they will need twice as long to complete 
the task; if they need to engage with three times as much data, they 
will need three times as long to complete the task; and so on. Other 
tasks are such that the length of time needed to complete them 
grows in an exponential fashion with the amount of additional data 
needed to be worked through: if they need to engage with twice as 
much data, they will need four times as long to complete the task; 
if they need to engage with three times as much data, they will need 
nine times as much time to complete the task; and so on. When 
computational tasks expand at an exponential rate, large data sets 
can make it impossible to complete the task. 
As it turns out, some seemingly simple mental operations suffer 
from a combinatorial explosion: the amount of time it takes to 
complete them grows at an exponential rate as the amount of data 
they need to sift through increases. Checking a set of sentences for 
logical consistency is such an operation. As Christopher Cherniak 
has shown, something as apparently innocent as checking the 
consistency of a set of a few hundred sentences, given certain ideal-
izing assumptions, would take from now until the heat death of the 
22
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 48 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol48/iss1/1
23 
 
 
universe.24 And what this means, in short, is that no possible 
computational device can do this. And if no possible computa-
tional device can do this, then, if our minds work the way that 
Fodor suggests they do, then we cannot do this either. The 
problem here generalizes. The kinds of computations which a 
Fodorian mind would need to carry out in its central system simply 
cannot be done. Our thinking cannot be carried out by way of 
mental representations which correspond to good arguments car-
ried out in natural languages. Since self-conscious deliberation 
gives us the impression that we are actually reasoning by way of 
such arguments, self-conscious deliberation misrepresents the 
nature of our thought. Our beliefs are not actually brought about 
by way of processes which are anything like the way they seem to 
us when we deliberate. 
What then is the alternative? David Hume suggested that belief 
acquisition is entirely a matter of the association of ideas: when one 
kind of idea is regularly followed by another—for example, the idea 
of one billiard ball striking a second is regularly followed by the 
idea of the second ball moving away—we come to expect that such 
a pattern will continue in the future. As Hume saw it, this was not 
a matter of reasoning. We do not apply any sort of inferential rules 
in coming to our conclusions. Rather, the fact that ideas relevantly 
like the first are regularly followed by ideas relevantly like the 
second causes us to form certain expectations.25 This Humean idea 
has been given contemporary expression in the work of various 
connectionists.26 Of course, connectionist models of human 
thought do not at all resemble the sorts of reasoning that we seem 
to go through when we deliberate. But that is precisely the point. 
Our belief acquisition and revision cannot possibly work the way it 
seems to when we deliberate, so the fact that connectionist models 
have this consequence cannot be counted against them. Any work-
                                                 
24 Minimal Rationality, MIT Press, 1986, Chapter 4. 
25 A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford University Press, 
1967, originally published 1739; Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and 
Concerning the Principles of Morals, L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford University Press, 
1966, (originally published 1777). 
26For foundational work on connectionism, see James McClelland, David 
Rumelhart, and the PDP Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: 
Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, vol 1: Foundations; vol. 2: Psychological 
and Biological Models, MIT Press, 1986. 
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able account of human cognition will inevitably have this conse-
quence. 
Connectionist models have one very simple rule of revision: an 
analogue of Hume’s law of association. There are other models of 
cognition which import more structure than this, without going so 
far as the Fodorian view that cognition is a matter of argument-
ation. Philip Johnson-Laird has proposed an account of mental 
models which charts just such a middle course.27 Problem solving 
is achieved, on this view, by the manipulation of mental models in 
rule-governed ways, but the models themselves do not correspond 
to sentences, and the mental manipulations do not correspond to 
anything like natural language argumentation. 
There are other approaches as well. As Fodor rightly suggested, 
our current understanding of central systems—that is, of belief 
acquisition and revision—is in a primitive state. What we do know, 
however, is that these processes do not actually work in the way 
they seem to when we engage in deliberation. Deliberation gives us 
the illusion that we are forming and revising our beliefs by way of 
mental processes that track natural language argumentation. More 
than this, we seem to be directly aware of the processes by which 
our beliefs are formed when we deliberate, and this too is an 
illusion. It now seems that a proper understanding of cognition will 
show that how the mind actually works is not only different from 
how it appears to work when we stop to deliberate. It is not even 
roughly like how it seems to work when we deliberate. Just how it 
does work, however, remains to be seen. 
6. Conclusion 
Too much of epistemological theorizing has presupposed a com-
mon sense conception of how the mind actually works. Prior to the 
advent of modern experimental psychology, there was little 
alternative to such an approach. But incomplete as our contem-
porary understanding of our mental life is, we have made 
substantial advances since the psychology available to Descartes 
and Hume. Any epistemology worth its salt must engage with our 
best available theories, even as we recognize that progress in our 
psychological understanding will inevitably bring with it modifica-
tions in our epistemological views. The recognition that advances 
                                                 
27 Mental Models, Harvard University Press, 1983. 
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in psychology will force such modifications does not license a 
methodology which simply turns its back on what we know. 
Common sense ideas about the value of deliberation and how 
it provides a check on unreflective processes of belief acquisition 
and decision lead to views which valorize reflective thought over 
automatic processing. Such views are no better than the opposite 
extreme on which one is told never to reflect and simply to trust 
one’s gut. The truth is, unsurprisingly, far more complicated than 
either of these two approaches would have it. Where reflection will 
benefit our thinking, and where it will lead us astray, where it will 
simply make us more confident, without making us more reliable 
believers and more effective decision makers, is something we 
cannot determine without very substantial experimental input. 
When we come to understand the process of reflection for what it 
truly is, rather than how it appears to us when we deliberate, we 
will better understand when reflection plays a constructive role in 
our thinking, and when it does not. What our current 
understanding seems to suggest, however, is that even where 
deliberation plays a constructive role, it works in ways wholly unlike 
the way it appears to us. 
I will not be surprised if many see the view of the mind I 
present here as overly mechanistic. Viewing non-human animals in 
this way is completely untroubling. The idea that adult humans 
have minds which, while more complicated than those of non-
human animals, are no less mechanistic in their operation, does not 
go down so easily. It will be said that other animals have minds 
which are moved by hard-wired mechanisms, while we actually 
reason. Their beliefs are produced in them passively, it will be said, 
while we bring about our beliefs. Other animals are not responsible 
for their beliefs or actions, it will be said, while it is an essential 
feature of human persons that we are responsible agents.28 I have 
been arguing that all of these contrasts are vastly overstated and 
                                                 
28 See, for example, these remarks by Paul Boghossian: 
I don’t see that a slight increase in the complexity of a hard-
wired algorithm governing a creature’s behavior can, all by 
itself, make for the difference between reasoning and mere 
mechanism, no matter how much the more complex algo-
rithms might contribute to a ‘more sensitive’ interaction with 
the environment. 
“Reasoning and Reflection: A Reply to Kornblith,” Analysis, 76(2016), 46. 
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that they flow from a view of adult human minds which mystifies, 
rather than explains, our mental life. 
When Darwin proposed the theory of evolution through natur-
al selection, his approach was met with concerns that it somehow 
denigrated the human species. Darwin did not see it that way at all. 
“There is grandeur in this view of life,” he wrote.29 The recognition 
that the human species is part of the natural world, and a product 
of the same forces responsible for the existence of other species, 
was not something that Darwin regarded as degrading. It is, 
instead, he thought, something we should look on with great awe 
and appreciation. Our evolutionary history is a remarkable thing, 
and an understanding of the extraordinarily complicated route by 
which our species came about is far preferable to any mythologiz-
ing or mystification that might be substituted for it. 
I regard the mechanistic picture of the human mind in much 
the same way. This is not a degrading picture of human mental life. 
It is one we should look upon with respect and admiration. The 
human mental mechanism is a wondrous thing. A genuine under-
standing of how it works, in all its complexity, is something we 
should seek without fear that we will somehow be diminished in 
coming face to face with our place in the natural world.30 
                                                 
29 On the Origin of Species, Joseph Carroll, ed., Broadview Texts, 2003, (originally 
published 1859), 398. 
30 Thanks to Regina Kornblith for helpful comments on a draft of this paper, 
and to the audience at Brockport for a challenging and very helpful discussion. 
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